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THE UNITED NATIONS AND EAST TIMOR
Ten years after the Indonesian government officially Incorporated East 
Timor as a province of the Republic of Indonesia, international attention has 
again been focused on Indonesia's occupation of the territory. US President 
Ronald Reagan's plans to visit Bali 1n May of 1986 prompted many members of the 
US Congress to urge him to raise the Issue of human rights violations by Indone­
sian troops in East Timor with Indonesian President Suharto. The letter to 
President Reagan signed by 122 members of Congress, dated April 29, 1986 ran as 
follows:
Dear Mr. President:
We continue to be deeply concerned about the human tragedy in 
East Timor, the predominantly Roman Catholic former Portuguese 
colony Invaded by Indonesia 1n 1975. Since then, an estimated 
100,000 East Timorese— nearly one-sixth of East Timor's original 
population— have perished from the combined effects of the Indonesian 
occupation. Armed conflict 1n the territory persists, as do reports 
of atrocities such as disappearances, summary executions, torture, 
and forced birth control.
Highly regarded International church sources confirm that 
serious human rights abuses continue. While there has been some 
ostensible Improvement In access to East Timor by international 
humanitarian agencies, such access remains limited. Unrestricted 
access 1s critical 1n light of reports that malnutrition-related 
deaths of children persist in at least some areas.
We therefore respectfully urge you to give serious attention to 
the East Timor situation 1n meetings that you and the Presidential 
party will have with Indonesian leaders during your visit to Indo­
nesia 1n May. As the first U.S. President to visit Indonesia since 
the December, 1975 invasion of East Timor, your Interest could 
contribute significantly to efforts that might prevent further 
bloodshed and misery 1n East Timor.
Secretary of State Shultz deserves credit for raising the issue 
of human rights 1n East Timor during h1s July, 1984 visit to Jakarta; 
that same month, Pope John Paul II expressed deep concern over the 
suffering of the people of East Timor. Further, 1n April, 1985, 
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher raised humanitarian and 
human rights Issues regarding East Timor during a visit to the 
Indonesian capital.
Continued fighting 1n the territory between the Indonesian 
military and the East Timorese resistance 1s reason for concern, 
coupled with persistent reports from Amnesty International and 
other organizations of human rights violations. Accounts of various 
pressures and Intimidation directed at the Roman Catholic Church in 
East Timor by Indonesian authorities are most disturbing. Also
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troubling 1s the matter of political prisoners. While the official 
number of East Timorese political detainees has dropped* Amnesty 
International and others report that a significant number of detain­
ees purportedly released have 1n fact been moved to less Identifiable 
places of detention. There have been accounts of "hidden” prisons 
and detention camps to which International humanitarian groups 
still do not have access.
Further alarming 1s the news of a population limitation program 
Introduced 1n East Timor by the Indonesians. Authoritative church 
sources say that this program 1s being carried out often without 
the consent or knowledge of the mostly rural population of East 
Timor. A program of this nature carried out by the Invaders them­
selves has troubling Implications, considering the huge death toll 
1n East Timor since the invasion and the comparatively small original 
population. Mr. President, we ask you to urge the Indonesian 
government to put an end to population limitation measures and 
practices in East Timor that do not have the full consent and 
knowledge of those directly concerned.
We seek efforts to ensure the continuation and expansion of 
access to East Timor by International humanitarian agencies, with 
guarantees of freedom of movement for these agencies so that the 
full range of their activities may be carried out to the greatest 
possible extent. In particular, all prisoners and detainees should 
be assured timely visitation. In addition, we strongly believe 
that the Roman Catholic Church 1n East Timor should be guaranteed 
an existence free from official pressure and Intimidation. Finally, 
the United States should encourage efforts to bring about a fair 
and peaceful settlement of the East Timor conflict.
We fully appreciate the importance of friendly relations with 
Indonesia. We are also aware that there will be many other Issues 
on your agenda when you travel to Ball. However, we respectfully 
ask you to add the plight of the people of East Timor to your 
agenda. You have a special opportunity to bring to bear on the 
Timor tragedy the prestige and moral Influence of the United States.
Sincerely,
Tony P. Hall (D-OH)
Robert K. Dornan (R-CA) 
Claude Pepper (D-FL)
George C. Wortley (R-NY) 
William H. Gray, III (D-PA) 
Helen Delich Bentley (R-MD) 
Joe Moakley (D-MA)
Tony Coelho (D-CA)
Mary Rose Oakar (D-OH) 
Barbara Boxer (D-CA)
Barney Frank (D-MA)
Gus Savage (D-IL)
Robert J. Mrazek (D-NY) 
Edolphus Towns (D-NY)
Peter H. Kostmayer (D-PA) 
Gerry E. Studds (D-MA)
J1m Moody (D-WI)
Doug Walgren (D-PA)
Howard L. Berman (D-CA)
Mike Lowry (D-WA)
Walter E. Fauntroy (D-DC) 
James J. Howard (D-NJ) 
Fernand J. St Germain (D-RI) 
Julian C. Dixon (D-CA)
Parren J. Mitchell (D-MD) 
Thomas J. Tauke (R-IA) 
Berkley Bedell (D-IA)
Fortney H. Stark (D-CA)
Joe Kolter (D-PA)
Jim Cooper (D-TN)
Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD)
Thomas A. Daschle (D-SD) 
William H111 Boner (D-TN)
Ron Wyden (D-OR)
Norman Y. Mineta (D-CA)
Sal a Burton (D-CA)
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Barbara B. Kennelly (D-CT) 
John M. Spratt, Jr. (D-SC) 
Timothy E. Wirth (D-CO)
Bob Carr (D-MI)
Martin Frost (D-TX) 
Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) 
Matthew F. McHugh (D-NY) 
Frank Horton (R-NY)
Howard Wolpe (D-MI)
John Edward Porter (R-IL) 
Alan Wheat (D-MO)
Byron L. Dorgan (D-ND) 
Douglas H. Bosco (D-CA) 
Robert A. Roe (D-NJ)
Robert T. Matsui (D-CA) 
Ronald V. Dell urns (D-CA)
John F. Seiberllng (D-OH) 
Tommy F. Robinson (D-AR)
Vic Fazio (D-CA)
James L. Oberstar (D-MN) 
Morris K. Udall (D-AZ) 
Charles E. Schumer (D-NY)
Bob Edgar (D-PA)
Henry A. Waxman (D-CA)
Sam Gejdenson (D-CT)
William J. Hughes (D-NJ) 
Robert W. Kastenmeier (D-WI) 
David E. Bonior (D-MI)
Gary L. Ackerman (D-NY) 
Edward F. Feighan (D-OH) 
Mervyn M. Dymally (D-CA) 
Bruce A. Morrison (D-CT) 
Chester G. Atkins (D-MA) 
Benjamin A. Gilman (R-NY) 
Earl Hutto (D-FL)
John Conyers, Jr. (D-MI) 
Martin 01av Sabo (D-MN) 
Austin J. Murphy (D-PA) 
Thomas R. Carper (D-DE) 
Donald J. Pease (D-OH)
Gerry Sikorski (D-MN)
Jim Bates (D-CA)
Leon E. Panetta (D-CA)
James Weaver (D-OR)
Mickey Lei and (D-TX)
Rod Chandler (R-WA)
Edward P. Boland (D-MA) 
Silvio 0. Conte (R-MA)
Peter W. Rodino, Jr. (D-NJ) 
Claudine Schneider (D-RI) 
Tom Lantos (D-CA)
Mike Synar (D-OK)
Nicholas Mavroules (D-MA) 
Lane Evans (D-IL)
William Lehman (D-FL)
Robert Garda (D-NY)
Charles A. Hayes (D-IL) 
Anthony C. Beilenson (D-CA) 
Bruce F. Vento (D-MN)
Don Edwards (D-CA)
William Clay (D-MO)
Matthew G. Martinez (D-CA) 
Albert G. Bustamante (D-TX) 
Mel Levine (D-CA)
Thomas M. Foglietta (D-PA) 
Patricia Schroeder (D-CO) 
Brian J. Donnelly (D-MA) 
Marcy Kaptur (D-OH)
Thomas J. Manton (D-NY) 
Major R. Owens (D-NY)
Thomas J. Downey (D-NY) 
James H. Scheuer (D-NY) 
George Miller (D-CA)
Stewart B. McKinney (R-CT) 
Stephen L. Neal (D-NC) 
Douglas Applegate (D-OH) 
Thomas A. Luken (D-OH)
John McCain (R-AZ)
Ted Weiss (D-NY)
Dave McCurdy (D-OK)
Louis Stokes (D-OH)
Bill Richardson (D-NM)
Dan G1ickman (D-KS)
Bill Green (R-NY)
Augustus F. Hawkins (D-CA) 
Edward J. Markey (D-MA)
Six days earlier, on April 23, 1986, twenty-one US Senators had signed the 
following letter to Secretary of State George Shultz:
Dear Mr. Secretary:
We commend you for publicly expressing United States concern for 
human rights in East Timor during your April, 1984 visit to Indone­
sia. Since that visit, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and 
Pope John Paul II, among others, have expressed a similar concern 
to President Soeharto. The repeated raising of the issue by world 
leaders has led to some improvement of the human rights situation 
in East Timor, but a number of serious problems remain.
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As you know, violence and repression have plagued East Timor since 
the 1975 Indonesian invasion of the Island. The United States 
should continue to encourage an equitable and peaceful resolution 
to the ongoing armed conflict 1n East Timor. The Immediate problems 
faced by the East Timorese, however, also demand attention. Speclfl- 
cal1y :
1. While public pressure has led to the release of some political 
prisoners, Amnesty International reports that many of those said by 
the government to have been released have 1n reality been transferred 
to secret detention camps. International humanitarian organizations 
do not have access to these "resettlement centers" because the 
Indonesian government does not acknowledge their existence. Since 
these political prisoners are isolated from world attention, the 
Indonesian government need not abide by International standards 
governing the treatment of prisoners. Many reports of torture 1n 
these "resettlement centers" have been received by Amnesty Interna­
tional .
2. The occupying Indonesian forces reportedly continue to intimidate 
both clergy and church members of East Timor's Roman Catholic 
Church. For the predominantly Roman Catholic East Timorese, such 
pressure only Increases the tension between themselves and the 
Indonesians.
3. Though the famine in East Timor has ended, malnutrition and 
related health problems still exist 1n some areas. A lack of 
cooperation between Indonesian authorities and International relief 
agencies could spell disaster for the East Timorese.
4. When Portugal granted East Timor Its independence in 1975, many 
families were separated. Those East Timorese still waiting to join 
their relatives 1n Portugal have suffered from unnecessarily slow 
action by Indonesian officials. Resolution of these family reunifi­
cation cases would be an Important humanitarian gesture by Indonesia.
We respectfully urge you to raise these concerns with the Indonesian 
government during your upcoming visit to the annual ASEAN meeting. 
We recognize the value of the relationship between Indonesia and 
the United States. Our friendship with Indonesia can only be 
strengthened by forthright discussion of the ongoing problems faced 
by the people of East Timor.
Thank you for your attention to this Important Issue.
Sincerely,
Bill Bradley (D-NJ) John Heinz (R-PA) 
Don Relgle (D-MI) 
Tom Harkln (D-IA)
Quentin Burdick (D-ND) 
John Chafee (R-RI)
Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY)
Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY)
Edward Zorinsky (D-NE)
Paul Simon (D-IL)
0r1n Hatch (R-UT) 
John Kerry (D-MA)
Patrick Leahy (D-VT) 
Paul Sarbanes (D-MD)
George Mitchell (D-ME) 
Christopher Dodd (D-CT) 
William Proxml re (D-WI) 
Charles Grass!ey (R-IA)
Claiborne Pell (D-RI) 
Alan Cranston (D-CA)
Albert Gore (D-TN)
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Since the President refused to raise the East Timor Issue with President 
Suharto, the Congress took further action: 133 members co-sponsored a resolution 
deploring the situation 1n East Timor and calling on Secretary Shultz to express 
US concern to the Indonesian foreign minister during the ASEAN meetings 1n 
Manila on June 24, 1986.
The United Nations had first addressed the Issue of East Timor on December 
11, 1975, only four days after the Indonesian Invasion. The General Assembly 
then adopted a resolution recognizing the rights of East Timor's people to 
self-determination, freedom, and Independence. This resolution, passed by a 
vote of 69 to 11, deplored Indonesia's military intervention and called on the 
Indonesian government to withdraw Its forces from the territory of East Timor. 
Among the thirty-eight countries abstaining were the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France, and West Germany. Although this resolution was reaffirmed 
annually until 1981, voting support for it was gradually eroded and in 1982 
there was a majority of only four for a weakened resolution.
Indonesian forces launched a new military offensive 1n September 1983, but 
this failed to destroy Fretelln (the Revolutionary Front for the Independence 
of East Timor), which heads the main armed opposition to the Indonesian occupa­
tion. In fact there has been some evidence that armed resistance against 
Indonesian forces has increased since then.
The UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar has attempted to reach 
some solution to the problem of East Timor by promoting talks between Indonesia 
and Portugal which the UN majority still considers the administering power 
there. Fretelln made clear Its support for UN mediation; but 1t opposed the 
Indoneslan-Portuguese talks held at the end of 1984 because they excluded 
representatives from the people of East Timor. It stressed that mediation 
should be in accordance with the United Nations' principle of self-determination. 
This view has received support from seventy-five members from both houses of 
the Japanese Diet who on April 18, 1986 sent the following letter to the 
Secretary-General:
United Nations Secretary General 
Mr. Javier Perez de Cuellar
Dear Secretary General,
As you are aware, a full decade has now passed since the Invasion 
of East Timor by Indonesian troops. We address you today because 
we believe 1n your sincere desire to work toward a just and lasting 
settlement of the East Timor conflict, a conflict which has already 
claimed an enormous toll 1n human life, both East Timorese and 
Indonesian.
We fully support the mandate given to you in General Assembly 
Resolution 37/30 "to Initiate consultations with all parties directly 
concerned" with a view to achieving a comprehensive settlement of 
the East Timor problem. We can also well appreciate the great 
difficulty and delicacy of your task.
1. For an analysis of the Timor problem from the perspective of Frel^elln's 
representative to the United Nations, see Jose Ramos-Horta, Tam: The Un^itUAhed Saga T a it Tamok (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press).
134
We are disturbed, however, to note that representatives of the 
East Timorese have yet to be included 1n these deliberations. 
Earlier this year you reportedly stated in press conferences in 
Jakarta and Tokyo that discussions between "both sides" (Indonesia 
and Portugal) appeared to be moving toward a solution of the fate 
of the East Timorese. Surely you will agree that discussions which 
do not include the East Timorese, notably FRETILIN, could not 
possibly lead to any meaningful solution of the fate of those same 
East Timorese.
Understandably you are anxious to work toward a speedy solution 
of this conflict. However, a cosmetic solution which ignores the 
fundamental right of the East Timorese to determine their own fate 
can only prolong the conflict. Furthermore, such a "solution of 
convenience," 1n contradiction to the very principles upon which 
the United Nations was founded, could not but be viewed as an act 
of cynicism by the peace-loving people of the world.
We therefore urge you to include, at earliest possible moment, 
representatives of the East Timorese, notably FRETILIN, in the 
negotiation process.
Finally, as you know, since 1975 Japan has consistently voted 
in the United Nations Fourth Committee and General Assembly against 
resolutions affirming the right of the East Timorese to self-determi­
nation. The fact that the Japanese government has taken this 
position without adequate survey of the situation and without any 
discussion of the matter in this country 1s deeply regrettable. I 
pledge, therefore, to make every effort to widely publicize this 
pressing Issue, an issue that involved the fate of an entire people, 
and to actively work to bring about a constructive contribution on 
the part of Japan.
Respectfully,
Japan Socialist Patty 
(Members of the House of Representatives)
Takako Doi 
Haruo Okada 
Tamio Kawakami 
Yasuko Takemura 
Shu-zoh Yasuda 
Nobuyuki Seklyama 
Matsuo Kodama 
Shun Oh-Ide 
Haruyoshl Hosoya 
Slgeru Gotoh 
Sanjl Mutoh 
Masao Hori 
Masahlro Yamamoto 
Ken-ichi Ueno 
Aogu Matsumae 
Taneaki Tanaml 
Bun Takebe
Hironori Inoue 
Kiichi Murayama 
Masao Nakamura 
Tohru Oh-Hara 
Shin-nen Tagaya 
Sukio Iwatare 
Shigeru Itoh 
Toshlharu Okada 
Tsuyoshl Suzuki 
Noboru Yag1 
Kazuo Okuno 
Kanji Kawasaki 
Selichi Inaba 
Ju-koh Nakamura 
Kazuhiko Tsujl 
Shohgo Ogawa 
Takatoshi Fujita
Man-kichi Katoh 
Tomiichi Murayama 
Takumi Ueda 
Issei Inoue 
Masao Sakon 
Sadao Wada 
Toshiaki Yokoyama 
Tsuruo Yamaguchi 
Toyoji Shirochl 
Chu-ryoh Mor11 
Hideyoshi Hirose 
Ichiroh Hino 
Yu-saku Yayama 
Torao Takasawa 
Selichi Katsumata 
Kanju Satoh
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(Members of the House of Councilors)
Cho-zoh Akiyama 
Tadashi Yaolta 
Tomoyuki Fukuma 
Akira Nakamura 
Jin-ichi Katayama
Wataru Kubo Hldeyuki Seya 
Akira Ono Shiroh Takeda 
Tatsuroh Matsumae Terumi Kasuya 
Michitada Takasugi Manae Kubota
United Sociai VemactatCc Patty
(Members of the House (Member of the House
of Representatives) of Councilors)
Satsuki Eda Hideo Den
Naoto Kan 
Shogo Abe
Komzi Patty
(Members of the House 
of Representatives)
Yu-ich1 Ichikawa 
Sho-zoh Kusakawa
(Member of the House 
of Councilors)
Takayoshi Wada
Vmoctatic Sacial-Ut Patty
(Member of the House 
of Representatives)
Roh Watanabe
SaLatyman Skint ok
(Members of the House 
of Councilors)
Shlgeru Aok1 
Heihachiroh Kimoto
N-ew Lib&tal Patty
(Member of the House 
of Representatives)
Kohki Chuma
SkitUii Club.
(Member of the House 
of Councilors)
Tokuma Utsunomiya
As East Timor reemerged as an important topic of international debate it 
appeared again on the United Nations agenda. On August 15, 1986, the UN Special 
Committee on Decolonization held hearings on East Timor, where an Indonesian 
representative, Mr. S. Wlryono, presented h1s government's position, and docu­
ments were put forward by representatives of the following groups:
British Campaign for the Defence of Political Prisoners and Human Rights 1n 
Indonesia
Indonesia East Timor Program (Canada)
Amnesty International 
Asia Watch
Society for Threatened Peoples 
Komitee Indonesie
Catholic Institute for International Relations 
(UK) Parliamentary Human Rights Group 
Christian Conference of Asia 
Hobart East Timor Committee
International League for the Rights and Liberation of Peoples
La Comunldad de Refuglados del Timor Oriental Residentes en Australia
Australia Council for Overseas Aid
Canada Asia Working Group
Comissao Para Os Direitos do Povo Maubere
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and by the following Individuals:
Professor Benedict R. Anderson 
Jose Ramos Horta
Monsignor Martlnho da Costa Lopes 
Professor Elizabeth Traube
Most of the documents presented were concerned with the specifics of human 
rights violations by Indonesian occupation forces, but the following statement 
may be of more general interest to readers of Indonesia as it provides a broader 
view of the current situation in East Timor, and compares the relationship 
between the UN and the East Timorese struggle today with that between the UN 
and the Indonesian independence struggle in 1945-49.
Statement by Be.ne.dUct R. O'G. A ndesaon
Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates,
It is now almost eleven years since the military regime in Jakarta launched 
its invasion of East Timor, and more than ten since the rubber-stamp Indonesian 
parliament passed a bill formally incorporating that country into Indonesia as 
its twenty-seventh province. Yet, as Murray Kempton, the most eminent of 
American journalists, noted last November: "Indonesia now has as many and 
possibly more troops in East Timor than on the day of the initial invasion. 
. . . Indonesia explains that the Timorese are pacified and content and grateful 
for their new roads and new literacy. There are, it concedes, 200 or so guer­
rillas still resisting— with unheard of vehemence and pertinacity, we may 
assume, since it takes a 10,000 member army to contain them."^
The best explanation for this situation was unwittingly given by no less than 
President Suharto in the course of last year’s Independence Day address to the 
Indonesian nation. On that occasion he said: "A fighter 1n the struggle, whose 
slogan 1s ’once a fighter, always a fighter,' will never cease fighting for the 
nation's ideals so long as he is a l i v e . H e  was of course referring to Indone­
sia's own four-year-long struggle for independence from Dutch colonialism (in 
which he himself played an active and honorable part), a struggle which in­
volved much death and destruction, though nothing comparable to what Suharto has 
visited on the East Timorese. The tragedy is that he has always obdurately 
overlooked the truth of his own words when dealing with the nation of East Timor.
What is the condition of East Timor today, after eleven years of foreign 
occupation? Reliable information is difficult to obtain. Nothing better 
demonstrates the failure of the Suharto regime's policies and Its bad conscience 
over the suffering 1t has inflicted on the people of East Timor than the fact 
that 1t keeps the country 1n the strictest Isolation it can manage. Few foreign­
ers have been permitted entry, and none has been allowed to travel freely or 
talk frankly with the local people. Even Indonesian* are required to have 
permits to enter what the regime claims is part of their own motherland.^ East 
Timor has no local press, and it is impossible to make long distance telephone 234
2. Washington Post, November 18, 1985. Most of the quotations cited in these 
footnotes can be found in Indonesia Re.poA.ti (available from Indonesia Publica­
tions, North College Park Station, P.0. Box 895, College Park, MD 20740).
3. Asian Wail Stneet Weekly, August 26, 1985.
4. See Andree Feillard's report in ASiaujeek, July 14, 1985.
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calls 1n or out of the country.^ The surrounding seas are strictly patrolled, 
and the overwhelming bulk of the 1,000 or so passengers who fly in and out of 
Dili each month5 6 are civilian occupation officials, of whom about 15,000 are 
now stationed in the territory.7 89102 The Indonesian press Itself operates under 
tight government controls so that the Indonesian reading public has only the 
sketchiest idea of what is going on.
Nonetheless, a good deal can be learned from unwary statements by Indonesian 
officials themselves. In significant ways these statements confirm what Amnesty 
International, representatives of the free East Timorese people, and various 
academic observers have already, or will shortly, be describing to you.
We may begin by noting that according to the Indonesian regime’s own census 
figures for 1980, the population of East Timor was then 555,350. By contrast, 
the Portuguese colonial census of 1970 gave a population of 609,477, and census 
officials in 1974 estimated that by then the figure had risen to about 650,000. 
Thus 1n the six years between 1974 and 1980, by conservative estimate, approxi­
mately 100,000 East Timorese, or 15 percent of the population, were wiped out 
by war, famine, and associated disease. A comparable percentage of the popula­
tion of the United States today would mean 36,000,000 dead. The inferences to 
be drawn from the censuses are confirmed by Mario Carrascalao, the Suharto 
regime’s governor in Dili, who last year told Reuters’ correspondent Peter 
Millershlp that at least 100,000 East Timorese had died untimely deaths since 
1975. Elsewhere he spoke of 20,000 orphans, 11,000 abandoned children, and 
8,000 crippled or maimed. For America, this would be equivalent to 8,600,000 
orphans, 4,600,000 abandoned children and 3,600,000 crippled or maimed. Yet 
the Immediate architect of this catastrophe, General Leonardus ’’Benny" Murdanl, 
visiting the Indonesian troops in Dili last Christmas, had the effrontery to 
remind them that, as he put it, "The teachings of Christ are love and peace."12
Nor did the death and destruction cease after the terrible anti population 
campaigns of 1975-79. Last year’s Amnesty International report listed the 
"disappearance" of at least 550 East Timorese noncombatant civilians since 
1979. For this and other reasons, which Amnesty has amply documented, the 
Nobel-Prize winning organization— which, I note, has never been permitted to 
conduct an investigation either in Indonesia or East Timor— decided to make the 
case of East Timor one of Its four major international campaigns l a s t  yzaz—  
after eleven years of Indonesian occupation. Amnesty International does not 
make such decisions lightly.
5. Sydnzy Manning HztialdL, December 10, 1985.
6. Statement of Arya Suparta, local Garuda Airlines manager in Dili, as cited 
in Slnaz Hazapan, April 10, 1985.
7. Report of Jacques Gull Ion, kgzn.cz. Tn.ancz-?zzssz, July 9, 1985.
8. According to J. Suwardiyo— by his name clearly a Javanese— who nonetheless 
was in 1985 head of the East Timor Department of Education and Culture. Slnaz Hanapan, September 13, 1985.
9. James Dunn, Tlmaz: A Pzaplz Bztsiayzd. (Milton, Queensland: The Jacaranda 
Press, 1983), p. 3.
10. As reported 1n Nluglnl Nlus, March 11, 1985.
11. Kompas, March 20, 1985.
12. Ibid., December 26, 1985.
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What can we learn of social conditions after ten years of so-called integra­
tion into Indonesia? Again, some of the most damaging information comes to us 
from Indonesian state officials. The 1980 census reveals that in that year 79 
percent of the East Timor population was Illiterate, and 67 percent had no 
speaking use of bahasa Indonesia, the Indonesian national language— which, by 
the way, is an exceptionally easy language to pick up. The situation has not 
much changed since then, to judge from a statement made last September by 
Clementino dos Reis Amaral, an East Timorese member of Indonesia's puppet 
parliament. Reporting on a visit by that parliament's Commission I to East 
Timor the previous month, he complained that "the use of the Indonesian language 
there is still uncommon.m1^ Ten years after integration— and in spite of 
General Murdani's peace and love. Last December, the secretary of the provincial 
government in Dili conceded that no more than thirteen East Timorese have 
received BA degrees, and all were obtained outside East Timor, since there was 
then no university or college in the territory itself.13 45 Governor Carrascalao, 
too, recently complained that he had no more than 1,000 native East Timorese 
officials who were literate— in any language.16 Small wonder that East Timor 
continues to be governed by a horde of foreign, i.e., Indonesian, civil and 
military bureaucrats.
But even if the educational and literacy levels 1n Integrated East Timor 
are so abysmally low, perhaps at least economic progress has been made? Not if 
a cautious pronouncement last year by the Indonesian parliament's Commission 
VIII is to be believed. The Commission stated that 70 percent of the province's 
housing failed to meet minimum health conditions; 60 percent of the territory's 
area was inaccessible by road; 30 percent of the population lived below even 
the Indonesian government's very low official poverty line; and the Ministry of 
Social Affairs, which is responsible for providing the state's medical and 
other welfare services, had not a single operational unit outside the city of 
Dili.17 Ten years after integration.
But perhaps now at least normal social life has returned to East Timor? 
The courageous Apostolic Administrator in Dili, Monsignor Carlos Ximenes Belo, 
stated last year that: "People, including me, feel as 1f we are in a jail In 
our own country."18 He personally had good reason for saying so insofar as the 
Suharto regime took six months to grant the exit permit that would allow him to 
visit his spiritual superior, Pope John Paul, in Rome.19 20 But even more revealing 
are the remarks of Governor Carrascalao, who told A4iauitek correspondent Andree 
Feillard in July 1985 that: "The people have not felt free in their movements. 
This is very much against the habits of the East Timorese. The Timorese are no 
longer people who can talk openly to each other. . . . The Timorese can not 
[even] produce food the way they would like."^6 What he meant by the final, 
somewhat cryptic words can be inferred from an additional comment he made that
13. S-cnast Hastapan, September 13, 1985.
14. Angkatan Btsuznyata  and SuM.ab.aya ?o4>t, September 11, 1985.
15. Indonesian Nem-i and View*, December 1, 1985.
16. Kompas, March 20, 1985.
17. Suana Kostya, April 27, 1985.
18. Interview with Jacques Guillon for Age.nct F->tanct-Pnes-it, August 8, 1985.
19. Ibid.
20. AAiauiejtk, July 14, 1985.
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1n the nine years between 1976 and 1985, the population of Dili increased 
tenfold, from 8,000 to 80,000. This huge migration has certainly not been 
caused by the city's bright lights, but rather by intolerably oppressive condi­
tions in the home villages of the unfortunate farmer-refugees. Ten years after 
integration.
To round out the picture, we may finally turn to the independence struggle 
itself. Other witnesses present here today will be able to speak far more 
authoritatively on this struggle than I. But once again, we can learn a good 
deal from pronouncements by highly placed officials of the Suharto regime. In 
late January last year, these officials were loudly celebrating the surrender 
of a guerrilla commander named Mauk Morak, whose importance was underlined for 
the Indonesian press by the fact that he brought in 200 other guerrillas with 
him. Unluckily, a few months earlier a leading military spokesman had stated 
that there were no more than 200 "bandits" left in the entire country. Had 
this been true, Morak's surrender with his 200 men would have ended the fighting. 
But of course it was not true. General Murdani conceded as much last October 
when he told A-4-cauittk correspondent Feillard that all that remained was "Xanana 
[commander of the East Timor nationalist guerrillas] with 100, 200, 1,000 . . . 
2,000 men."21 2 Since the last figure is twenty times larger than the first, one 
gets the impression that Murdani's field intelligence can not be very accurate. 
One notes also that the 2,000 figure is larger than anything the Suharto regime 
has conceded for years. Thus, if Murdani's highest estimate is correct, there 
are reasons for thinking that the armed resistance is getting stronger rather 
than weaker— an impression strengthened by the renewed appearance on the air of 
the guerrilla radio, and by the large numbers of Indonesian troops in East 
Timor. Confirmation of this impression comes from reports by two Western 
journalists who made brief visits to East Timor last year. Andree Feillard 
reported that 1n the Eastern sector of East Timor, only the few road links, the 
towns and their immediate surroundings were regarded by Indonesian of^iciaL*  
them itiues as "under full control."2  ^ Jacques Guillon of Agence France-Presse 
recorded 1n July 1985 that he encountered no less than thirteen military road­
blocks along the 210 kilometer road between Dili and Los Palos, a part of the 
country supposedly completely pacified! On a visit to the military cemetery in 
Dili he found 84 new graves with death-dates between January 1 and July 3, 
1985.24 25 What he might have discovered at other military cemeteries had he been 
permitted to visit them, we do not know— we do know, however, that Qpvernor 
Carrascalao was enraged that he managed to see even the one 1n Dili. ^ But 
casualties on this scale indicate that the independence struggle is very much 
alive. Meanwhile, Amnesty International has been documenting the summary 
trials of many dozens of so-called subversives. Amnesty is rightly concerned 
about the flagrantly abusive character of these trials, in which not a single 
person has been acquitted, and where defense lawyers, none of them speaking 
Tetum, the national language of East Timor, have spent no more than one or two 
weeks on each case. But we may find confirmation, precisely from the scale of 
these abuses, of the anxiety and insecurity of the occupying forces. If East 
Timor were really the satisfied, pacified, integrated place that the Jakarta 
regime claims it is, such busy kangaroo courts would be wholly unnecessary.
21. Jakarta Post, August 7, 1985.
22. Asiauitek, October 11, 1985.
23. Ibid., July 14, 1985.
24. Cited in the MeX.bauA.nt Ag t, July 9, 1985.
25. As Lincoln Kaye reported in Pan Easttnn Economic Ptuiejui, July 20, 1985.
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I would like to summarize the conclusions that flow incontrovertlbly from 
the data presented so far* before proceeding to the final portion of my testi­
mony. I say Incontrovertlbly, because most of this data comes not from exiled 
East Timorese, not from representatives of Fretilin, and not from Indonesians 
opposed to the Suharto regime. The main source 1s the Suharto regime Itself. 
If officials of this regime concede the deaths of at least 15 percent of the 
East Timorese population of 1975; the existence of thousands of orphans, aban­
doned children, as well as maimed and crippled people; overwhelming Illiteracy; 
massive non-use of the Indonesian language; severe economic backwardness; a 
pervasive climate of fear and suspicion; strengthened guerrilla resistance; and 
the continuing need to Isolate East Timor even from Indonesians— then we can be 
confident that, after eleven years of brutal military occupation, the so-called 
pacification has failed, not to speak of Integration.^®
Let me now turn to Indonesia, and raise the question of what Interests and 
whose Interests are engaged 1n the continuing occupation of East Timor. The 
Indonesian people’s perhaps? Indonesian nationalism has long been a deep and 
powerful force. It not only survived, but grew steadily stronger over three 
decades of political, and four years of armed, struggle against Dutch colonial­
ism. In the spring of 1949, the Dutch military succeeded not only in taking 
control of 95 percent of the towns in Indonesia, but also captured President 
Sukarno, Vice-President Hatta, the head of the infant national air force, and 
many other leaders. In February 1949 almost no one could have Imagined that by 
December 1t would all be over, with the Netherlands transferring legal sove­
reignty to a free Sukarno and Hatta, as President and Vice-President of the 
United States of Indonesia. But this is what happened. It happened partly 
because Indonesian freedom-fighters continued their resistance 1n the rural 
areas, just as East Timorese freedom-fighters are doing today. It also happened 
because the United Nations had the courage and energy to make Its presence 
felt, and to bring to bear the weight of world opinion. In addition, the 
allies of the Netherlands, most notably the United States, also made clear that 
they could no longer support Dutch policies.
At no point 1n this long, courageous struggle; nor under the remarkably 
free liberal parliamentary regime of 1950-59; nor under President Sukarno’s 
Guided Democracy of 1959-65, with its militant anticolonial1sm; nor during the 
first ten years of General Suharto’s regime did any significant Indonesian 
group express the slightest Interest 1n East Timor. Only when this tiny, 400- 
year old Portuguese colony seemed finally about to become free, thirty years 
after Indonesia’s own proclamation of Independence, did a Jakarta government 
decide to intervene. This historical record shows that there 1s no genuine 
connection between Indonesian nationalism and East Timor. I can also say that 
I have never met an Indonesian not a government official who evinced any emo­
tional attachment to East Timor or identified with 1t. And if the Indonesian 
government Itself sincerely believed that the East Timorese were ’’brothers,” it 
seems Impossible to believe that it would deliberately have brought over 100,000 
of them to their deaths; or would, to this day, make it so difficult for ordinary 
Indonesians to enter the territory of their "brothers.” 267
26. No wonder Tempo opened its long series of texts commemorating the tenth 
anniversary of East Timor's formal absorption into Indonesia with these sardonic 
words: "Timor Timur, kin1 apalagi dulu, memang bukan surga.” Tempo, July 19, 
1986, pp. 34-37, at p. 34.
27. See the classic account of all this given in George McT. Kahin, Natlonall-im and Revolution In  lndone.Ha (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), chs. 11 
and 13.
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Perhaps the Interest was in the security of the Indonesian state? It has 
been said that the East Timorese were unlucky 1n the timing of their declaration 
of Independence 1n 1975, only months after the collapse of the Thleu regime 1n 
Saigon and that of Lon Nol In Phnom Penh. Some observers are persuaded that 
these events greatly alarmed the Suharto regime, which in 1965-66 had destroyed 
the Indonesian Communist Party, supervised the massacre of probably half a 
million of Its supporters, and imprisoned a further million. These observers 
believe that Suharto's entourage genuinely feared that an independent East 
Timor might prove a safe haven for Indonesian subversives and even offer military 
facilities to hostile foreign powers. In fact, there are good reasons to be 
skeptical of this argument. But even if 1t were true, the situation has com­
pletely changed since 1975. General Murdanl has repeatedly been received as an 
honored guest 1n Hanoi; and while Jakarta still has no formal diplomatic ties 
with the CPR, trade relations flourish, and a number of high Indonesian officials 
have been on informal visits to Peking. Relations with the Soviet Union and 
the states of Eastern Europe are good, indeed Jakarta has recently been stressing 
the need for additional aid and trade. Most Important of all, over the past 
two years General Murdani has repeatedly stated that Indonesia faces no external 
threat over the next decade.28 This being the case, there 1s today no plausible 
"national security" justification for the continuing occupation of East Timor.
What then? Only two small groups in Indonesia have a real interest in the 
occupation. One is a clique of officials and businessmen who have made great 
profits from monopoly control of East Timor's superb export coffee, and hope to 
do still better from the oil reputed to lie beneath its surrounding waters. 
The other is a not much larger group of senior military officers who devised 
and carried out the occupation, built their careers on it, and for reasons of 
face and power can not bear to contemplate its abandonment. They are only too 
aware of the fate of the Greek junta after the debacle in Cyprus, and of the 
Argentinian generals after the misadventure in the Malvinas. These two, small 
groups control Indonesian public life, but they do not represent the Indonesian 
people. Nor will they be around forever. There is absolutely no reason why, 
over the long haul, the nations of Indonesia and East Timor can not live side 
by side in amity— as indeed Indonesia does today with its other neighbors, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, the Philippines, and— with obvious qualifications 
(resulting from the Suharto regime's brutal treatment of the population of West 
Irian)— even Papua-Niuginl.
The people of East Timor have suffered unimaginably for having done no more 
than claim those rights to self-determination on which the whole organization 
of the United Nations is based. It is therefore surely only right and proper 
for the United Nations to do now for East Timor what it did so successfully for 
Indonesia itself less than forty years ago.
The United Nations can do so first by reiterating and strengthening the 
principle of self-determination, and thus the right of the people of East Timor 
to decide their own political future. Conversely, it can resolutely reject any 
claims to legitimacy for the Suharto regime's occupation of the country.
In the second place, it can lend active support to the efforts of Portugal 
to fulfill honorably its decolonizing responsibilities. It is striking evidence 
of Portuguese concern that as recently as last December, the Portuguese parlia­
ment passed unanimously a resolution opposing further Indonesian occupation of
28. See, for example, his remarks to correspondent Feillard, reported in A<Uawzzk, October 11, 1985.
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East Timor. I note that the Portuguese parliament is exactly the opposite of 
the rubber-stamp parliament in Jakarta* which 1s the product of rigged and 
manipulated elections, and over the past twenty years has not once enacted a 
substantial law on its own Initiative. The Portuguese parliament 1s the product 
of genuinely free elections and contains representatives of every type of 
political view from left to right. Unanimity from this parliament on the East 
Timor questions indicates a papula* concern about East Timor that 1s notably 
absent in Jakarta. Strong support from the United Nations would be extremely 
helpful to any positive Portuguese initiative. With such support, there 1s no 
reason in principle why Lisbon could not supervise a process whereby the people 
of East Timor could freely express their varied political views and exercise 
their fundamental right to self-determination.
Thirdly, the United Nations could strongly encourage Indonesia’s closest 
friends to exert their influence and extend their good offices. As I mentioned 
earlier, a key factor in the successful decolonization of Indonesia in 1949 was 
a significant change in the policy of the United States, from more or less 
strong support of the Dutch position to a more sympathetic concern for Indone­
sia's rights— and this precisely at a time when many thought Indonesia's cause 
was lost. A major reason for American success in changing the policy of The 
Hague was, aside from longstanding ties of friendship, Washington's financial 
underwriting of the wartorn Dutch economy and of the war effort in Indonesia. 
The role played by the United States alone in 1949 can today be jointly reenacted 
by the United States and Japan. ® Ninety-five percent of the military equipment 
used in the initial Indonesian invasion in 1975 was American— even though its use 
for the invasion blatantly violated the terms of the 1958 US-Indonesian bilateral 
arms agreement. Jakarta's main arms purchases since 1975 have been of American 
provenance, and most have been of a kind developed for counter-guerrilla opera­
tions. Thus the United States bears the same kind of responsibility for Indone­
sian aggression in 1975-86 as it bore for Dutch aggression in 1946-49. Just for 
this reason, however, a change 1n US policy would have a profound impact in 
Jakarta. At the same time the US and Japan have long been the major underwriters 
of, and investors in, the Indonesian economy. In Jakarta both Tokyo and Washing­
ton are regarded as friends, with no interest whatever in causing domestic 
political turmoil. All the more reason, therefore, why a change 1n Japanese 
and American positions on East Timor would be taken very seriously in Indonesia. 
It seems to me that the UN, and particularly those members who have the closest 
ties with the US and Japan, could, and should, do their utmost to encourage 
these two states to exert in a new, constructive way the influence they clearly 
have in Jakarta. The peaceful liberation of East Timor would not only end the 
eleven-year nightmare its people have suffered, but would also remove a grave 
stain on Indonesia's good name, not to speak of stopping a continuing drain on 
the lives of its ordinary soldiers and the resources of its hardpressed, ordinary 
people.
29
29. Vlanio N o tlc la i, December 6, 1985.
30. In this regard, the letters signed by 122 US Congressmen, 21 US Senators, 
and 75 members of the Japanese Diet, are a significant expression of growing 
public concern in the two countries.
